

1 February 1955

**ISRAELI REACTION TO SPIES' EXECUTION**

- I. As yet, no official word on Israeli reactions to Monday execution. On basis pre-execution comment, can expect strong response.
- A. Ambassador Lawson (Tel Aviv) reported Prime Minister Sharett "visibly shaken" by Egyptian intention execute spies.
- B. Other high Israeli officials warned "terrific" public reaction (in line with prior suggestions popular attitudes might bring about war).
- C. Because present government is shaky coalition, Sharett also insists he might be forced yield to intemperate elements. Emphasized his moderate policy being increasingly criticized by people as result:
1. US arms agreement with Iraq.
  2. Refusal Suez Canal transit for Israeli ships.
  3. Iraqi-Turkish defense proposals.
  4. Syria's detention 4 Israeli soldiers.
- D. Execution of spies in Cairo comes as climax to above series.
- II. We can anticipate these Israeli moves--
- A. Strong international campaign (using diplomats and Jewish organizations) to discredit, embarrass Egypt, particularly Nasr regime.
- B. Violent Israeli press campaign urging war.

Noted by DD/I  
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State Dept. review completed

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C. Tacit Israeli governmental approval maximum reprisal activity on Egyptian frontier.

III. However, war not anticipated, unless Egypt loses restraint on frontier.

A. Also, despite voiced concern, fall of Sharett government not expected at present.

B. Should change of government nonetheless occur under present circumstances, almost certain to bring regime to power which would be more belligerent and war-minded than Sharett.